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WHY CULTURE MATTERS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:  
THE MARGINALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE WORLD BANK 
 
By Galit A. Sarfaty*    
 
 Why do international institutions behave as they do? International organizations (IOs) 
have emerged as significant actors in global governance, whether they are overseeing monetary 
policy, setting trade or labor standards, or resolving a humanitarian crisis. They often execute 
international agreements between states and significantly influence domestic law. It is thus 
important to analyze how international institutions behave and make policy. In order to 
understand institutional behavior and change, it is useful to conduct an ethnographic analysis of 
the internal dynamics of IOs, including their formal and informal norms, incentive systems, and 
decision-making processes. This Article analyzes the organizational culture of one particularly 
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powerful international institution—the World Bank—and addresses the question of why the 
Bank has not adopted a human rights policy or agenda.1 
Established on July 1, 1944, the World Bank has become the largest lender to developing 
countries, lending over $20 billion per year.2 With over 10,000 employees (including 
economists, sociologists, lawyers, and engineers, among others), its mission is poverty reduction, 
which it primarily carries out through its development lending.3 While the institution has adopted 
a number of social and environmental policies and works on issues as diverse as judicial reform, 
health, and infrastructure, it has not adopted any overarching operational policy on human rights. 
Human rights concerns are not systematically incorporated into the everyday decision-making of 
staff or consistently taken into consideration in lending; existing incorporation of human rights is 
ad hoc and up to the discretion of employees.4 In addition, many employees consider it taboo to 
discuss human rights in everyday conversation and to include references to it in their project 
documents. The marginality of human rights stands in contrast to the Bank’s rhetoric, including 
official reports and public speeches by its leadership in support of human rights.5  
                                                 
1 While the Bank has no operational policies on human rights per se, its Indigenous Peoples Policy 
addresses the rights of indigenous peoples. 1 WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OD 4.20, ¶ 
6 (Indigenous Peoples) (which aims to ensure that “the development process fosters full respect for the[] dignity, 
human rights, and cultural uniqueness” of indigenous peoples).  
2 The World Bank Group, one of the United Nations’ specialized agencies, consists of five closely 
associated institutions, which are owned by member countries that carry ultimate decision-making power in all 
matters, including policy, financial, and membership issues. The term “World Bank Group” encompasses all five 
institutions, including the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The term “World Bank,” as I use it in this Article, refers 
specifically to two of the five, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA). 
3 Out of the 10,000 Bank employees, about 7,000 are based in the Washington, D.C. headquarters and 
3,000 work in the field offices. 
4 There are some minor exceptions. For instance, some Bank documents have referred to human rights, and 
certain employees indirectly work on human rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights. 
5 See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 
(1998); HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson 
eds., 2005) (including contributions by senior World Bank officials, including former President James Wolfensohn); 
THE WORLD BANK INSTITUTE DEVELOPMENT OUTREACH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 2006). 
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What do I mean when I say that human rights is a marginal issue within the Bank? In 
other words, there is no comprehensive or consistent approach on the policy and operational 
levels. In more specific terms, there are at least three provisions/safeguards missing at the Bank: 
(1) There is no staff policy to mitigate the impact of Bank projects on human rights. (2) When 
Bank employees engage in country dialogues or draft Country Assistance Strategies, they are not 
required to consider countries’ obligations under international human rights law.6 (3) The Bank 
has no guidelines on when it would suspend operations due to human rights violations.  
Why should we be surprised that human rights is such a marginal issue at the World 
Bank? I contend that there are a number of compelling reasons for why the Bank’s approach to 
human rights (or lack thereof) appears counterintuitive. First, other institutions involved in 
poverty reduction, including the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund, and the UK’s Department for International Development, have begun to adopt 
human rights policies or a rights-based approach to development.7 Second, the Bank has been 
subject to pressure from civil society organizations and internal advocates to integrate human 
rights considerations in its projects and programs. Third, private financial institutions have begun 
to address human rights more openly out of a concern for their public image and the reputational 
                                                 
6 The World Bank normally develops a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) every one to three years in 
consultation with the borrower country’s government and civil society organizations. This strategy addresses the 
country’s top development priorities, creditworthiness, past portfolio performance, and the level of financial and 
technical assistance that the Bank seeks to provide the country. 
7 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNDP PRACTICE NOTE (2005); 
UNITED NATIONS (UNICEF) EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE: GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED PROGRAMMING 
APPROACH (1998). A rights-based approach typically requires institutional change and the creation of accountability 
mechanisms so that human rights are treated as constitutive of the goal of development. Yet scholars have 
challenged its effectiveness in achieving practical, on the ground changes to development work. See CELESTINE 
NYAMU-MUSEMI & ANDREA CORNWALL, WHAT IS THE “RIGHTS-BASED” APPROACH ALL ABOUT? PERSPECTIVES 
FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES (Institute for Dev. Stud. Working Paper No. 234, 2004); PETER 
UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004); Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of 
the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 755 (2005); Mac Darrow & Amparo Tomas, Power, Capture and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights 
Accountability in Development Cooperation, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 471, 537 (2005). 
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risk of committing human rights abuses.8 Even the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
Bank’s private sector arm, has openly adopted human rights as part of a risk management 
approach, although its engagement in selective human rights has been subject to criticism by 
NGOs.9 Despite these three factors, one would have expected the Bank to have already adopted a 
strategy on human rights. Yet it has not. Why? 
I argue that legal and political obstacles do not fully explain this phenomenon; what has 
been missing from existing explanations is an anthropological analysis of the Bank’s 
organizational culture that would shed light on internal obstacles to the adoption of human rights 
norms. Whether and how the Bank should adopt human rights is a topic that has been discussed 
at length by academics and civil society advocates.10 However, I contend that this literature 
primarily focuses on legal arguments for binding the Bank and its member countries to 
international human rights obligations. It does not investigate the internal workings of the 
bureaucracy in order to understand why the Bank has yet to adopt and internalize human rights 
norms. This Article offers an empirical analysis of the Bank’s organizational culture based on 
ethnographic field research at the institution over four years, including personal interviews, 
participant observation, and analysis of Bank documents.11 My ethnographic research on the 
World Bank sheds light on why organizational change has not occurred and suggests the 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., The Equator Principles for private banks that are modeled after the International Finance 
Corporation’s social and environmental policies, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/. 
9 See, e.g., Steve Herz et al., The International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards and the 
Equator Principles: Respecting Human Rights and Remedying Violations? (2008) (representing views from a 
number of NGOs including the Center for International Environmental Law, Bank Information Center, Oxfam 
Australia, and World Resources Institute), at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/IFC_Framework_7Aug08.html. 
10 Recent books devoted to this topic include: MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD 
BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 126 (2003); BAHRAM 
GHAZI, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2003). 
11 See infra Part II.C for a more detailed description of my research methods. 
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conditions under which it can happen. The reason why I selected this case is because despite 
external pressure over the past two decades and repeated attempts by insiders to push the human 
rights agenda forward, there has been neither norm adoption nor internalization.12  
I have found that the ways in which norms become adopted and ultimately internalized in 
an institution in large part depends on their fit with the organizational culture. When a new norm 
is introduced, employees may interpret it in different ways. In the case of the Bank, employees 
from different professional groups often have distinct interpretive frames that they use to define 
issues, analyze their relevance to the Bank’s mission, and apply them in practice. Proponents of a 
norm must account for internal conflict over competing frames when trying to persuade staff to 
accept it. They must also consider the operational procedures, incentive system, and management 
structure of the organization when determining the most effective strategy of implementation. 
Thus in order to bring about internalization, actors must adapt norms to local meanings and 
existing cultural values and practices—in other words, they must “vernacularize” norms.13  
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I argue that theories of international 
institutions should account for the internal dynamics within organizational cultures, which shape 
how institutions change and influence state behavior. Ethnographic research can help us analyze 
the conditions under which norms are internalized, including the degree to which they should be 
legalized. Applying a principal-agent model to IOs, I then argue that one has to look beyond 
                                                 
12 Adoption refers to an institution’s acceptance of a norm and its manifestation as a formal or informal 
rule. Internalization refers to the acceptance of a norm by actors within the organization who are persuaded of its 
merits and validity through such processes as social learning, framing, and deliberation. Ryan Goodman and Derek 
Jinks refer to these mechanisms as persuasion. They distinguish persuasion from coercion and acculturation, which 
entails the adoption of norms without belief in their content, driven by social and cognitive pressures. Ryan 
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 621 (2004). 
13 Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 39 (2006). See also SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: 
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2005). 
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states to understand and predict how international institutions behave. In Part II, I address the 
question of why human rights has remained such a marginal issue at the Bank, despite internal 
and external pressure that would suggest otherwise. After reviewing legal constraints in the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement and failed efforts from the early 1990s through 2004 at 
introducing a human rights agenda at the Bank, I argue that bureaucratic obstacles have played a 
large role in impeding human rights adoption. I focus on the 2006 Legal Opinion on Human 
Rights by the departing General Counsel and its failure to generate organizational change due to 
its uncertain legal status and internal conflict within the department.14  Part III analyzes the 
Bank’s organizational culture, including formal and informal processes of norm socialization; the 
incentives and operational policies that influence what employees value and how they reconcile 
competing goals; the production and circulation of knowledge within the organization; and 
power dynamics between professional subcultures. I focus on the prestige of economists and the 
lower status of lawyers in the Legal Department, and  ultimately argue that the clash of expertise 
in the Bank is a critical obstacle in achieving human rights norm internalization. Part IV argues 
for the importance of framing norms to adapt to organizational culture. After examining 
interpretive battles among Bank lawyers and economists over how to define human rights norms 
and interpret them with respect to the Bank’s mission, I discuss the most recent attempt to 
introduce human rights into the Bank. I describe how members of the Bank’s Legal Department 
are following an incremental strategy of framing human rights for economists, which 
demonstrates how they are learning from the failures of prior attempts and adapting their 
                                                 
14 Roberto Dañino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank  (Jan. 27, 2006), at 
http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/?q=en/node/335. 
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approach to the Bank’s organizational culture. The conclusion analyzes the potential risks of 
achieving norm internalization at the Bank by economizing rather than legalizing human rights.  
I. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
 
  International organizations (IOs) have become an emerging topic of study among 
scholars in international law and international relations. My case study of the World Bank 
demonstrates the importance of ethnographic research towards explaining IO behavior. An 
analysis of an IO’s bureaucratic culture, including the politics of expertise within it, can help 
explain organizational change. It can identify conditions for the internalization of norms, 
including the degree to which they should be legalized. Applying a principal-agent model to IOs, 
I argue that one has to look beyond states to understand and predict how international institutions 
behave, particularly when their behavior departs from the interests of member states. 
Analyzing Norm Diffusion and the Limits of Legalization Through Ethnographic Research 
 
 
Studies of international institutions should account for their internal dynamics, including 
possible internal divisions between departments and individuals. Instead of only focusing on 
state interests, we need to examine the bureaucratic practices of the background experts that run 
institutions. As my study of the World Bank affirms, the actions and decisions of bureaucrats are 
critical factors in shaping how the institution operates and influences state behavior. These 
experts “do not speak in the language of interests or ideologies—they speak professional 
vocabularies of best practices, empirical necessity, good sense, or consensus values.”15 In order 
                                                 
15 David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 11 
(2005). 
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to understand the politics of expertise within IOs, we must analyze their underlying 
organizational cultures.  
Previous scholarship in international relations (IR) and international law has understudied 
the norm dynamics that operate within IOs and overemphasized the role of states in shaping IO 
behavior. The rational actor theories that have historically dominated international relations—
realism and functionalism—are largely state-centric in their analyses of how IOs behave.16 IOs 
play a larger role in the models developed by neoliberals and institutionalists, who disaggregate 
the state and focus on the actions and interests of individuals, interest groups, and political 
institutions that shape state preferences. Constructivist accounts have further departed from 
traditional IR theory by providing more autonomy to IOs, which serve as vehicles by which 
states are socialized into complying with norms.17 Yet while constructivists have moved 
international relations away from state-centric theories, they are only beginning to provide 
empirical accounts of IO behavior.18  
While legal scholars have increasingly treated IOs as their object of study, they have 
underemphasized their organizational cultures and internal politics. Interest-based models 
provide a rationalist account to explain state interests and behavior.19 Norm-based models, 
including managerial theory and the transnational legal process school, have focused on the 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986); KENNETH N. 
WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979). 
17 See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. (1998); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391-425 (1992). 
18 MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
IN GLOBAL POLITICS 6 (2004); Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999). 
19 See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
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question of why states comply with international norms.20 Scholars have also measured the 
extent of countries’ implementation and compliance with treaties over time.21 In addition, there 
is a growing literature on mechanisms of norm socialization to explain how law influences state 
behavior.22 Yet, this scholarship has not investigated the process of norm development within 
IOs. What is needed is evidence of what David Kennedy calls “the vocabularies, expertise, and 
sensibility of the professionals who manage . . . background norms and institutions, [which] are 
central elements in global governance.”23  
  Ethnographic research can provide a comprehensive analysis of the organizational 
cultures of IOs and how they change. It involves an in-depth, case-oriented study, including 
long-term fieldwork within an institution and in-depth interviews. Fieldwork means that one is 
usually “living with and living like those who are studied. In its broadest, most conventional 
sense, fieldwork demands the full-time involvement of a researcher over a lengthy period of time 
. . . and consists of ongoing interaction with the human targets of study on their home ground.”24 
Conducting fieldwork in an institution means that one engages in direct, first-hand observation of 
employees’ daily behavior and participates in their activities, such as training workshops, 
seminars, and project meetings. In addition, one often conducts archival work and interpretive 
analysis of documents. 
  Anthropological research aims to answer a question rather than test a hypothesis. It is not 
based on prior assumptions or models, as are other methods. Rather, hypotheses and theories 
                                                 
20 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). 
21 See ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998). 
22 See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 12. 
23 Kennedy, supra note 15, at 3.   
24 JOHN VAN MAANEN, TALES OF THE FIELD: ON WRITING ETHNOGRAPHY 2 (1988). 
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emerge from the data, and are constantly evaluated and adjusted as the research progresses.25 The 
following is a concise summary of the cycle of ethnographic research: 
 
In ethnography . . . you learn something (“collect some data”), then you try and make 
sense of it (“analysis), then you go back and see if the interpretation makes sense in light 
of new experience (“collect more data”), then you refine your interpretation (“more 
analysis”), and so on. The process is dialectic, not linear.26  
 
Therefore when ethnographers interview subjects, they “do not automatically assume that they 
know the right questions to ask in a setting.”27 Interviews are usually unstructured or semi-
structured with open-ended questions that are developed in response to observations and ongoing 
analysis. The questions are designed to seek respondents’ interpretations of what is happening 
and allow them to describe problems, policy solutions, their rationales, etc. in their own words.  
My ethnographic study of the World Bank followed this research protocol. As part of my Ph.D. 
dissertation research in anthropology, I worked and conducted fieldwork at the Bank 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. for approximately two years over a period of four years, from 
2002-2006. During the summers of 2002 and 2004, I served as a consultant and intern in the 
Legal Department and the Social Development and Environment Departments of the Latin 
America and Caribbean region. My position as an intern for two summers afforded me the trust 
to gain access for a full year of fieldwork, from September 2005 until July 2006. While this 
                                                 
25 John Comaroff argues that “anthropology always rests on a dialectic between the deductive and the 
inductive, between the concept and the concrete, between its objectives and its subjects, whose intentions and 
inventions frequently set its agendas” (Michèle Lamont & Patricia White, Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards 
for Systematic Qualitative Research 37, report available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf). 
26 MICHAEL H. AGAR, THE PROFESSIONAL STRANGER: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOGRAPHY 62 
(1996). 
27 HELEN B. SCHWARTZMAN, ETHNOGRAPHY IN ORGANIZATIONS 54 (1992). 
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Article is focused on my research during this time, I have revised the material accordingly based 
on recent developments.  
  My methods included interviews with more than 70 staff (from project managers to a 
former President), Executive Directors, U.S. Treasury officials, and NGO representatives; 
participation at Bank training sessions and seminars; and analyses of Bank projects and 
documents. When I observed meetings or interviewed employees, I described the purpose of my 
research and obtained their informed consent. Almost all interviews were recorded and 
transcribed, and were conducted under the condition that I not use the employees’ names. Thus I 
only provide the current (or former) position and department of the people that I interviewed, 
unless I was given verbal consent to provide their full identity.28  
  By conducting ethnographic research on the Bank, I was able to uncover the formal and 
informal norms and the decision-making processes within the institution that shape state 
behavior. I aimed to examine the institution from the top down as well as the bottom up, 
focusing not only on its leadership and administrative structure, but also on the tasks and 
incentives of staff. I analyzed the informal practices and unspoken assumptions held by 
employees that may be misinterpreted by or hidden from external observers as well as the 
employees themselves. By doing so, this study reveals the competing subcultures and other 
internal contestations that may impede norm internalization.  
Why do certain norms and policies become adopted in an institution while others do not? 
An ethnographic analysis of organizational culture can explain how and why certain norms are 
framed, interpreted, and implemented by IO officials. IR scholars describe a case of unsuccessful 
                                                 
28 For those interviewees who gave their consent, I have attached their full names or exact titles to their 
quotations. Otherwise, I have provided general descriptions of each interviewee’s position and department.  
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norm diffusion as “the dog that didn’t bark.”29 The case of the diffusion of human rights at the 
World Bank is more precisely a case of the “dog that didn’t—at least initially—bark.” My 
empirical research investigates why human rights norms have been historically rejected by the 
Bank and have only recently moved closer toward being adopted and internalized. It is important 
to study these cases in order to identity the conditions of possibility for the internalization of 
norms within IOs.  
I contend that the conditions under which norms are internalized by IO officials are 
shaped by how the norms are framed. In particular, the degree of “legalization” of human rights 
norms influences whether staff adopt and internalize them. The extent to which legalizing human 
rights impedes or facilitates internalization will depend on the organizational culture.  
 My study departs from conventional writing on legalization, including its definition and 
its strategic value for implementing human rights. When legal scholars discuss “legalization,” 
they often refer to the definition used in recent IR literature: as “a particular form of 
institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation.”30 
According to this definition, legalization describes “a particular set of characteristics that 
institutions may (or may not) possess.”31 This conception is more applicable to an institutional 
regime or arrangement (e.g., European Community law or WTO agreements), rather than the 
structure or status of a specific norm within an institution.  
I would like to focus on a different aspect of legalization—the extent to which norms are 
perceived as having a “legal” status, often in relation to an existing legal system (e.g., the 
                                                 
29 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 43 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 83, 86 (1999). 
30 Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000). See also JUDITH 
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (2001). 
31 Id.  
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international human rights regime). In other words, to what degree are norms conceived as 
“legal” norms (rather than moral, cultural, or professional norms, for instance)? This 
understanding of legalization addresses the relationship between a norm and its legal expression, 
and whether “legal norms, as a type, operate differently from any other kind of norms.”32 With 
respect to human rights (the focus of my study), these norms could be framed as moral or 
political concepts, as well as legal concepts. Amartya Sen critiques “the entirely law-dependent 
views of human rights” and argues that they be defined as ethical rather than legal claims.33 He 
believes that “human rights can have influence without necessarily depending on coercive legal 
rules.”34 Going one step further, there are instances when a law-dependent view of human rights 
can hinder its influence. 
 This leads us to an assessment of the strategic value of human rights legalization.35 In the 
past few decades, there has been a trend towards the legalization of human rights and 
international institutions in general.36 Legal scholars have emphasized the benefits of 
legalization, which “tends to bolster the credibility of normative commitments, increase 
compliance with international norms, and provide a highly rationalized mode of clarifying and 
resolving interpretive disagreements.”37 Yet there are costs associated with human rights 
legalization, particularly when it occurs in institutional environments that value non-legal 
principles or seek non-legal goals (such as respect for moral values like dignity). For example, 
                                                 
32 Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 INT’L L. & POL. 699, 701 (2000). 
33 Amartya Sen, Human Rights and the Limits of Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2913, 2916-17 (2006). 
34 Id. at 2921. Sen further elaborates on this argument in Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human 
Rights, PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS (2005). 
35 See Jack Donnelly, The Virtues of Legalization, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67 (Saladin Meckled-García & 
Basak Çali eds., 2006). 
36 Derek P. Jinks, The Legalization of World Politics and the Future of U.S. Human Rights Policy, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 357, 360 (2002). 
37 Id. at 361. 
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during the creation of human rights commissions in post-authoritarian regimes in the 1990s, 
there were attempts “to detach human rights from their legal moorings and redefine them as a 
generalized language of public morality.”38 Citing the harmful consequences of overlegalization, 
Laurence Helfer advocates for a cost-benefit view of legalization in his case study of the 
Caribbean backlash against human rights regimes.39 Although Helfer adopts the IR definition of 
legalization defined above and applies it to human rights treaties rather than norms within 
institutions, he raises important questions about the usefulness of legalization in particular 
contexts.40  
In examining why legal norms could have distinctive effects in certain institutional 
contexts but not others, Martha Finnemore notes that “[a]n organization staffed mostly by 
lawyers is likely to find legal norms more persuasive than other kinds of norms and to give them 
special weight. . . . If economists (or members of some other profession) dominated policy 
making, we would expect norms of that profession, and not legal norms, to be particularly 
powerful.”41 Finnemore’s example applies aptly to the case of the World Bank.  
My research demonstrates that legalizing human rights would not be an effective strategy 
for their adoption at the Bank. Framing human rights norms in legal terms may limit their 
persuasiveness and impede their internalization. This is because of the dominance of economics 
and the marginality of lawyers and legal frames within the Bank’s organizational culture, as I 
further describe in Part III. Thus a key condition for the internalization of human rights norms is 
                                                 
38 See Richard Ashby Wilson, Is the Legalization of Human Rights Really the Problem? Genocide in the 
Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 81, 
84. 
39 Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002). 
40 Id. 
41 Finnemore, supra note 32, at 704. 
   
 15 
finding an institutional fit with the organizational culture. Finding an institutional fit requires that 
norms become vernacularized so that they resonate with pre-existing understandings. This 
involves “a dynamic process of matchmaking.”42 Proponents of a norm should act strategically—
e.g., through norm framing, cuing, or persuasion—in order to ensure congruence with the 
organizational culture. 
Looking Beyond Member States 
 
 
 My empirical study demonstrates that institutions can have relative autonomy when 
member states hold competing preferences and do not reach consensus. In these circumstances, 
IO officials have discretion and can significantly influence how the institution behaves. While 
the Bank’s member states cast a shadow over the Bank, what has been underemphasized is how 
much decision-making autonomy the agency has in pushing issues forward under their radar.  
One can analyze the relationship between the Bank and member states by applying a 
principal-agent model that includes multiple principals. The multiple-principals problem is an 
extension of the traditional model, which assumes that principals and agents are unitary actors.43 
Multiple principals may hold competing preferences and may be unable to effectively exert 
oversight over the agent. Because oversight is costly, they are often forced to delegate authority. 
This leaves the agent with considerable independence.44 Bureaucratic drift occurs when an 
agency makes decisions or implements policies that diverge from the goals preferred by the 
                                                 
42 Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change 
in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239, 243 (2004). 
43 Richard W. Waterman & Kenneth J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?, J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. & THEORY 173, 181 (1998). 
44 See id.; Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203, 
211-12 (2005). 
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principals.45 Bureaucratic drift is particularly common in a multiple principals situation since a 
conflict of interests among warring principals may prevent them from agreeing on common goals 
and exerting oversight over the agency.46 This is often the case in an international institution, 
where there is a “long chain of delegation” from the principals (or member states) to the IO 
agent.47 
The World Bank represents a multiple-principals problem, where member governments 
serve as principals that collectively form the Board of Executive Directors. The Board is 
composed of 24 Executive Directors who represent countries or country groups.48 Under the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the Board serves as the institution’s policy-making organ while 
the President and senior management are responsible for operational, administrative, and 
organizational issues.49 The Executive Directors thus serve as principals that delegate certain 
tasks and responsibilities to agency officials. When member countries hold competing 
preferences and cannot achieve consensus on a policy, there may be bureaucratic drift. Since it is 
difficult for them to effectively exert oversight, the member countries are forced to delegate 
authority to the agency officials. These dynamics have been confirmed by my ethnographic 
research on the Bank. When studying its internal decision-making process, I discovered that 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Administrative Process and Organizational Form as 
Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., 
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989). 
46 Horn & Shepsle, supra note 45, at 502. 
47 Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and 
World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241, 242 (2003).  
48 Five Executive Directors are appointed from the five donor countries that contribute the largest number 
of shares—currently, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. The other nineteen 
Directors are elected by regional groups of the other member countries. The Bank links voting power to members’ 
capital subscriptions, which are based on a country’s relative economic strength.  
49 The Board meets once or twice a week to vote on loan and credit proposals and to make decisions on 
strategic and policy items, including the administrative budget. 
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employees operate quite independently from the Board. Certain sensitive management issues are 
carried out without Board approval or involvement. The Board’s limited influence is in part due 
to the short tenure of its members and its protocol of reaching almost all decisions by consensus.  
An institutional constraint that favors agency autonomy is the short time horizon of 
Board members as compared to that of the Bank President. Most Executive Directors serve for 
just one or two two-year terms, whereas the President’s tenure can be at least 5 years or more if 
he or she is reelected. Roughly a third of the Board members change each year. As a result, the 
Directors’ knowledge of the history and practice of the institution is quite narrow.50 According to 
an interview by Catherine Caufield with former Director Moíses Naím, “It is impossible, even 
for the few of them that have a good prior understanding of the institution, to master the 
overwhelming array of complex issues on which they are supposed to develop an independent 
opinion.”51 Naím further explains that the Directors end up relying on the guidance of 
management because they are “no match for a usually brilliant group of professionals with 
decades of experience at the Bank.”52  
Given the different time horizons of the President and the Executive Directors, the 
President can incrementally introduce changes that will not be perceived as too radical by Board 
members. This is because they have a limited institutional memory and, as multiple principals, 
cannot effectively exert oversight over the President. Former President James Wolfensohn 
adopted an incremental strategy for introducing changes during his second five-year term. By 
this time, he had served the Bank longer than any Board member and was able to get a lot more 
                                                 
50 Interview with James Wolfensohn, former President, World Bank, in New York, N.Y. (June 14, 2007). 
51 CATHERINE CAUFIELD, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE WORLD BANK AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 238 
(1996). Moíses Naím, a former Venezuelan trade and industry minister, was an Executive Director at the Bank 
representing a bloc of countries including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Spain, and Venezuela. 
52 Id. at 239. 
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done as compared to his first few years in office. Wolfensohn treated the Board in the following 
manner: 
 
[I]f you make the assumption to the Board that this is the way you operate, you 
very rarely get challenged. . . . So if you can proceed in the institution with a set of 
assumptions that you are doing things in the way they should be done, . . . you can 
incrementally do a tremendous amount. Because it’s unlikely that anyone will 
challenge you. Because they think that maybe this is the way the Bank should 
operate. So I got a lot of things done incrementally without coming to the Board 
for big policy decisions. I knew that if I went to the Board on many of the policy 
decisions, [I’d] run into a hell of a lot of problems.53  
 
Wolfensohn adopted this incremental strategy when pushing forward his corruption agenda. He 
noted that by the time he had left, he was spending about six or seven million dollars a year on 
corruption, although he had never presented a policy to the Board.54  
Another important reason for why the Board lacks significant power over Bank 
management and staff is that it historically only operates by consensus (with few exceptions). 
The Board has historically been deeply divided over the issue of human rights. Some member 
states like China and Saudi Arabia are highly opposed to an explicit human rights agenda that 
would include the protection of civil and political rights (which they view as a reflection of 
“Western” values). Others like India and Brazil (middle-income countries that are responsible for 
a substantial portion of the Bank’s revenue) are afraid that human rights would increase 
transaction costs for loans.55 Among countries that moderately support a human rights agenda, 
                                                 
53 Interview with James Wolfensohn, former President, World Bank, in New York, N.Y. (June 14, 2007). 
54 Id. 
55 There are a number of other reasons for their opposition, including their view that a human rights agenda 
would encroach on their sovereignty and turn the institution into a human rights enforcer. Some countries fear that 
human rights would become a conditionality on lending, which may adversely affect borrower countries with poor 
human rights records while not punishing donor countries with similar records. Finally, certain countries view 
human rights as a political consideration that is restricted under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement. 
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there is disagreement over what it would look like. Should the Bank adopt a rights-based 
approach to development, a human rights operational policy, or a human rights impact 
assessment that would limit possible human rights violations caused by projects? Among such a 
diverse Board constituency, it is difficult to agree on a single approach. Because the Board 
operates by consensus, disagreements on such issues as human rights have simply resulted in 
inaction. 
Since Bank officials have recognized the unlikelihood of getting Board support for a 
human rights agenda, they have avoided proposing it for fear of a backlash against the issue if 
they tried and failed to gain approval. Instead, internal advocates are introducing sensitive topics 
like human rights not through Board approval but by making incremental changes in 
operations.56 In other words, they are supporting a strategy that is under the radar screen of 
member states.  
II. THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE WORLD BANK 
 
 
Over the past two decades, NGOs and internal advocates have pressured the Bank to 
introduce a human rights agenda in the institution. One would expect the Bank to have been 
swayed by this pressure along with the growing trend among corporations and development 
agencies to address human rights more openly. Yet it has not. Many scholars have cited legal 
reasons for why the Bank has not adopted human rights norms. In the first section below, I 
clarify and describe the uncertainty over the Bank’s human rights obligations under international 
law. I then analyze legal restrictions in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement that have historically 
served as the major obstacle to the Bank’s direct engagement in human rights. However, I argue 
                                                 
56 See infra Pt. V. 
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that legal constraints are insufficient reasons and that internal factors have played a major role. 
Failed efforts at reform by internal advocates suggest the critical role of bureaucratic obstacles in 
impeding human rights adoption. After describing these internal campaigns and their inability to 
produce institutional change, I discuss the most recent attempt at reform—the 2006 Legal 
Opinion on Human Rights by a former General Counsel. Its failure to generate momentum 
among staff or create substantive changes in policy was in part due to questions over its legal 
status. As I further explain below, there was uncertainty over whether the opinion constitutes an 
official World Bank legal opinion because it had not been requested by the Board nor submitted 
to the Board for approval. Yet despite the opinion’s uncertain legal status, members of the Legal 
Department did not or even refused to circulate the opinion due to internal conflict within the 
department over value-laden issues like human rights. 
 
The Bank’s Obligations Under International Law 
 
 
What does international law say about the Bank’s responsibilities with respect to human 
rights? Does the Bank have an obligation to ensure that its projects, programs, and internal 
policies are consistent with international human rights standards, and that its activities do not 
facilitate human rights abuses? Does it have a responsibility to promote human rights in its 
member states?  
In order to address these questions, the first, most imporant issue to explore is the extent 
to which the Bank as an international organization is bound by rules of customary international 
law beyond its charter, including customary international law norms on human rights. There is a 
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debate over this question, as there is over what constitutes customary international law on human 
rights. 
The Bank functions as an international body with legal personality due to “the nature of 
the specific powers granted under [its] Articles (notably the power to conclude agreements 
governed by international law, and the provisions establishing their relationship with other 
international organizations), their entitlement to specified privileges and immunities, and the fact 
that they operate extensively within the international sphere. . . .”57 According to legal scholars, 
the Bank’s status as an international legal person implies its role as both a subject and object of 
international responsibilities and obligations, possibly including obligations incumbent upon the 
organization under international agreements and customary international law.58  
Because international organizations cannot become parties to human rights treaties as 
states can, they are not directly bound by treaties. Yet, according to the International Court of 
Justice, international organizations can be bound by obligations under general principles of 
international law59 and capable of possessing international rights and duties.60 IOs are also bound 
by jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law such as the prohibition against 
genocide.61 In addition, the Bank has obligations as a specialized agency of the United Nations.62 
The Bank must respect the purposes and principles in the U.N. charter, including “the human 
                                                 
57 DARROW, supra note 10, at 126. 
58 See, e.g., DARROW, supra note 10; SKOGLY, supra note 10; Daniel Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, 
and Human Rights, 6 TRANSNAT’L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 63 (1996); Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a 
Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights and the World Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on 
Indigenous Peoples, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 527 (2002); Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An 
Analysis of the Legal Issues and the Record of Achievements, 17 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 39, 47 (1988).  
59 See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73, 89-
90 (Dec. 20). 
60 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 
61 Henry G. Schermers, “The Legal Bases of International Organization Action,” in A HANDBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 401, 402 (Rene-Jean Dupuy ed., 1998). 
62 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, art. IV(2), 16 U.N.T.S. 346, 348 (1948). 
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rights purposes as stated in Article 55, as elaborated in the [Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights] and the body of international human rights law built upon it.”63 It must also give “due 
regard” for decisions of the U.N. Security Council, although it is not required to follow the 
recommendations of the U.N.’s specialized human rights agencies.64 
 The second issue with regard to the Bank’s obligations under international law is whether 
the institution has any obligations vis-à-vis its members. Because only some of its member states 
are parties to particular human rights agreements, the Bank’s responsibilities would vary with 
respect to different members. There is a debate regarding whether the Bank should go as far as 
enforcing states’ treaty obligations through loan conditionalities or should just implement them 
through technical assistance.65  
Finally, there is the issue of what role, if any, international financial institutions (IFIs) 
like the Bank should play in the progressive development of international law—e.g., by 
promoting human rights in development. While international conferences, such as the 1993 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and the 2000 Millennium Summit, have recognized 
the interdependence between human rights and development,66 the rules of customary 
international law in this area are still subject to dispute.  
 In summary, the international legal obligations of the Bank with respect to human rights 
are a matter of dispute among legal scholars. The institution has skirted most of these arguments 
                                                 
63 DARROW, supra note 10, at 128. 
64 See SKOGLY, supra note 10, at 99-102; Bradlow, supra note 58, at 63. 
65 Daniel D. Bradlow, Should the International Financial Institutions Play a Role in the Implementation 
and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law?, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 695 (2002). 
66 At the 1993 Vienna World Conference, a consensus affirmed, “Democracy, development and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. . . . The international 
community should support the strengthening and promoting of democracy, development and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world” (para. 8). 
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and instead focused on its limited mandate under its Articles of Agreement, whose interpretation 
has become the locus of contention among Bank staff, advocates, and policymakers.67  
The Bank’s Articles of Agreement 
 
  In addressing the question of why the Bank has not adopted a human rights agenda, many 
scholars, policymakers, and advocates have focused on restrictions in the institution’s Articles of 
Agreement, or founding constitution. The legal restrictions arise from two provisions: (i) Article 
IV, Section 10; and (ii) Article III, Section 5(b), which place limits on the factors that staff can 
consider in their decisions.68 Article IV, Section 10 prohibits political activity and permits only 
economic considerations in decision-making: 
 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; 
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to 
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighted impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article I. 
 
Article III, Section 5(b) limits the factors that the Bank can consider in the granting of loans and 
restricts political considerations: 
  
The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are 
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other 
non-economic influences or considerations. 
 
                                                 
67 See sources supra note 10. 
68 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Art. IV, sec. 10, 
and Art. III, sec. 5(b), July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440 (1945), 2 U.N.T.S. 134 (1947) [hereinafter Articles of 
Agreement]. 
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These provisions have historically stymied the Bank’s explicit engagement with human rights, 
particularly civil and political rights, which have been interpreted as “political considerations.” 
As a result, Bank employees have claimed that their work can only indirectly promote human 
rights. 
 The General Counsel’s office has provided the authoritative interpretation of the Articles 
of Agreement from time to time with respect to human rights, including what is considered an 
allowable “economic consideration” and a prohibited “political” one. The official interpretation 
has evolved over time to reflect an incremental expansion of the Bank’s mandate and a multi-
faceted view of development, including not only its economic dimensions but also its political, 
social, and cultural ones.69 Former General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata authored the most 
influential opinions, which expanded the Bank’s mandate and acknowledged the centrality of 
human rights within development work: 
 
While the Bank is prohibited from being influenced by political considerations, its 
staff increasingly realize that human needs are not limited to the material “basic 
needs” often emphasized in the 1970s. . . . [N]o balanced development can be 
achieved without the realisation of a minimum degree of all human rights . . . .70  
 
In the past two decades, Shihata’s opinions and memos have provided legal room for the Bank’s 
involvement in areas that were once deemed as too political, such as legal and judicial reform 
and anti-corruption efforts. Yet human rights, especially certain civil and political rights, have 
still been considered too political for the Bank to directly address in its work. While restrictions 
in the Articles of Agreement have continued to serve as a legal obstacle to human rights 
                                                 
69 DARROW, supra note 10, at 152. 
70 IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 133 (1991). 
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adoption, bureaucratic obstacles have been more critical in impeding internal efforts at reform. 
Efforts at Reform and Reasons for Failure 
 
 
Institutional memory points to the early 1990s as one of the first internal campaigns to 
integrate human rights into operational work. Leading this initiative was an interdisciplinary 
working group of operational staff from the African region. The initiative was framed as part of a 
new institutional focus on good governance as a key ingredient for development.71 While the 
working group organized a number of brown bag lunches, workshops, and symposia, it became 
inoperative in the mid-late 1990s. One reason was that many of the group members became very 
busy with their work on governance and corruption, which had become a priority at the 
institution. In addition, some of the senior officials who had previously supported the working 
group had retired or moved to other departments. Without support from senior staff, it was 
difficult for the working group members to invest resources in human rights research and 
education. This changed by the late 1990s. 
In 1995, James Wolfensohn became President of the Bank and ushered in an era of more 
open dialogue on human rights. According to Wolfensohn, it took about three to four years to 
educate staff that human rights was an important issue within the context of the Bank’s work.72 
Under his leadership, the Bank published its first official report on human rights, which 
recognized the institution’s role in promoting and protecting human rights but stopped short of 
                                                 
71 See THE WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH. A LONG-TERM 
PERSPECTIVE STUDY 60-61 (1989) (“Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of 
governance. . . . [What is required is] a systematic effort to build a pluralistic institutional structure, a determination 
to respect the rule of law, and vigorous protection of the freedom of the press and human rights.”). 
72 Interview with James Wolfensohn, former President, World Bank, in New York, N.Y. (June 14, 2007). 
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stating that it had an international legal obligation to do so.73 Since the report’s publication in 
1998, Bank documents and speeches have periodically mentioned human rights, although the 
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors has continued to oppose its official incorporation into 
institutional policy.74 President Wolfensohn recognized the unlikelihood of getting the Board to 
spearhead a human rights agenda since it was and remains deeply divided over the issue. Instead 
of consulting with the Board, Wolfensohn and senior management appealed to employees to try 
to build support within the institution.  
The momentum for a potential human rights strategy began in 2002. On May 2nd of that 
year, the Bank organized an all-day internal workshop entitled “Human Rights and Sustainable 
Development: What Role for the Bank?,” which was attended by about 100 employees from 
across the institution. The purpose of the workshop was to increase staff awareness of human 
rights and to discuss possible implications for Bank operations. In a plenary address to the 
workshop, President Wolfensohn announced that the mood was changing and it was time to take 
the words “human rights” out of the closet.75 He then invited a number of senior staff to lead an 
institution-wide task force on human rights and draft a strategy paper that he could present at the 
Bank’s next Annual Meetings.76  
Coordinated by the Social Development Department, the task force included staff from 
several departments including Legal, Human Development, External Affairs, Sustainable 
Development, and Poverty Reduction. Including representatives from a variety of departments 
                                                 
73 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 5. 
74 See DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, REALISING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR POOR PEOPLE: 
STRATEGIES FOR ACHIEVING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TARGETS 16 (2000) (concluding that “the 
reluctance of some of [the Bank’s] shareholders . . . to incorporate human rights into its development work could 
constrain its poverty reduction strategies”).  
75 Human Rights & Sustainable Development: What Role for the Bank?, Summary of Proceedings 12 (May 
2, 2002). 
76 Id. at 11. 
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was critical since it allowed for cross-disciplinary dialogue and prevented one department from 
co-opting the agenda. On June 2003, the task force presented a background report on human 
rights to the Board’s Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE). The report reviewed 
the Bank’s existing work in support of human rights and identified the difficulties of adopting a 
human rights policy.77 Although it recommended that the Bank merely adopt human rights 
principles (instead of a policy or a rights-based approach), the committee ultimately did not 
approve the report.78 The committee and senior management felt that they were not ready to 
approve a report on such a controversial issue. According to one task force member, although 
senior officials had reviewed multiple drafts, they just “got cold feet” about passing a paper on 
human rights and began to “backpedal.”79 They called for more background studies and analysis 
before progressing any further on a strategy. 
Following the committee’s meeting, Wolfensohn assigned the human rights portfolio to a 
managing director in charge of human development issues—Mamphela Ramphele.80 During the 
fall of 2003 and early 2004, Ramphele and her senior advisor Alfredo Sfeir-Younis pursued a 
decentralized approach with regional human rights focal points, who were given the latitude to 
determine how they would address the issue. Some regions did not follow up on this request, 
while others simply wrote stocktaking reports of their human rights-related activities. There was 
little coordination among the regions, with Ramphele only chairing a couple of meetings with the 
new focal points and senior management. 
                                                 
77 Interview with former official, Social Development Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 
16, 2006). 
78 The task force did not bring the issue to the full Board of Executive Directors but only its Committee on 
Development Effectiveness, since it did not want to sharpen existing divisions on the Board. Members of the task 
force now regret that they did not at least prepare a public statement based on their work. 
79 Interview with former official, Social Development Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 
16, 2006). 
80 The Bank’s managing directors rank directly below the President. 
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The “crescendo” of this phase of internal human rights advocacy occurred in March 
2004.81 On the first of the month, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary 
Robinson and New York University law professor Philip Alston convened a conference on the 
law school’s campus on “Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement.”82 
The conference featured a keynote address by Wolfensohn and presentations by a number of 
senior officials, including the recently appointed General Counsel Roberto Dañino who outlined 
what would later become his legal opinion on human rights. But the momentum seemed to stop 
soon thereafter. Aside from the publication of a book based on the conference, there was no 
substantive follow-up and no major resources devoted to continuing this initiative. In addition, 
Mamphela Ramphele resigned from the Bank in April 2004. 
Why did the flurry of activity over human rights between 2002 and 2004 not result in the 
adoption of a human rights strategy? It would seem that many key ingredients were in place for 
human rights norm adoption and eventual internalization: (i) support from the President to 
develop a strategy that would be presented to the Board; (ii) the appointment of a managing 
director to oversee the human rights portfolio; and (iii) an interdisciplinary task force with 
representatives from different departments. So why didn’t the task force and the Ramphele-led 
initiative succeed in gathering internal support and pushing through a Bank strategy on human 
rights?  
Those familiar with the events, including several task force members, cite a number of 
reasons for why the task force and region-based initiative failed to capitalize on the growing 
momentum towards human rights norm adoption. These reasons include excessive caution and 
                                                 
81 Interview with official, Bank Information Center, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 31, 2006). 
82 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT, supra note 5. 
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backpedaling on the part of senior management and the Board’s Committee on Development 
Effectiveness; internal resistance to collaborating with civil society organizations; and a lack of 
resources to carry out the requisite activities for increasing staff awareness on human rights. 
Wolfensohn himself admits that he should have placed more emphasis on the issue of human 
rights during his tenure: 
 
The thing that I thought I had done was to establish the issue of human rights as 
being an important issue for people at the Bank. If I didn’t go far enough, then I 
made a mistake. . . . Maybe in retrospect, I should’ve made a bigger deal of it and 
tried to put it within the context of some legal framework or some administrative 
framework.83 
 
Moreover, there were criticisms that the task force leaders were too theoretical and 
underemphasized the concrete practical steps that were needed to push the agenda forward.84 
Some thought Ramphele lacked the political capital and Bank experience to influence senior 
management. Even though she was a managing director, many employees viewed her as an 
outsider since she had only joined the Bank in 2000, and as lower in status than the two other 
managing directors since she was responsible for the “soft” issues like human development.85 
Yet based on my interviews, the most significant factor behind the failure of internal 
attempts between 2002 and 2004 was a clash of expertise. Task force members complained of 
the difficulty of reaching consensus among people from different sectors and disciplinary 
                                                 
83 Interview with James Wolfensohn, former President, World Bank, in New York, N.Y. (June 14, 2007). 
84 Interview with official, Human Rights Watch, in Washington, D.C. (July 20, 2006). 
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 30 
backgrounds, who held divergent views on how to define human rights and interpret them with 
respect to Bank operations.86 The theoretically oriented people (who emphasized the 
indivisibility of human rights) clashed with the more pragmatically minded, who were mainly 
concerned with operational issues and the need to make trade-offs between different rights in 
projects with limited budgets. One employee intimately familiar with the events explained that 
the failure to bring about a human rights strategy was not due to resistance from the Board or 
senior management but rather “turf battles, and just the difficulty of doing something like this in 
such a multi-sectoral organization.”87 Amid internal disputes, the task force failed to build a 
constituency among staff in support of its mission. 
 The final piece that was missing was support from the Legal Department, which is 
surprising given the centrality of the Articles of Agreement in determining the Bank’s role with 
respect to human rights. Although the task force included a lawyer from the department, he did 
not consult with the General Counsel and did not consider himself the department’s official 
representative on the issue of human rights. Other members of the Legal Department felt shut out 
from the process by task force members.88 In the fall of 2003, when Ramphele led a 
decentralized approach with region-based human rights focal points, the Legal Department was 
only belatedly included in discussions. Finally, there were turf wars between the Legal 
Department and the regional departments, which wanted to remain in control of the human rights 
agenda and not cede it to the lawyers.  
                                                 
86 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
87 Interview with official, Social Protection Team, Human Development Network, World Bank, in 
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 While the turf wars continued, the Legal Department’s role in discussions over human 
rights expanded following the appointment of a new General Counsel, Roberto Dañino, in late 
2003. Dañino championed the human rights agenda over the next two years and paved the way 
for recent efforts by members of the Legal Department (discussed in Part IV).  
The 2006 Legal Opinion on Human Rights  
 
 
On January 31, 2006, on his last day as the Bank’s General Counsel, Roberto Dañino 
dropped a bomb on the desks of his staff (or more accurately in their computers).89 Members of 
the Legal Department woke up that morning to an email from Dañino with an attachment 
entitled, “Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank.”90 Its topic was not 
a surprise to many given that Dañino had been a champion of this issue during his tenure at the 
Bank and was credited with opening up space inside and outside the institution for a dialogue on 
human rights. He set up a small working group on human rights only one month after he had 
arrived at the Bank. Over the next two years, he strengthened the Bank’s relationship to the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and gave a number of speeches on the 
important role of human rights in the Bank’s work.  
The closing statement from Dañino’s legal opinion reads: 
 
The Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to 
recognize the human rights dimensions of its development policies and activities 
since it is now evident that human rights are an intrinsic part of the Bank’s 
                                                 
89 Dañino had resigned from the Bank on January 13, 2006, due to disagreements with then President Paul 
Wolfowitz. 
90 The document was officially dated January 27, 2006. Dañino concurrently released a second legal note 
and related discussion note on “Bank Activities in the Criminal Justice Sector.”  




This view represents a significant departure from the previous official interpretation by former 
General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata.92 Both Shihata and Dañino interpreted provisions in the 
Articles that have a bearing on human rights, particularly those that prohibit political activity and 
permit only economic considerations in decision-making.93 While Shihata was the first to 
acknowledge the relevance of human rights for the Bank, he never went so far as saying (as 
Dañino did) that there are instances where a country’s human rights violations should be taken 
into account. He also did not recognize the indivisibility of rights, as he noted that “there are 
limits on the possible extent to which the World Bank can become involved with human rights of 
civil and political nature. . . .”94 Moreover, Shihata applied a strict definition of economic factors 
as those that have a “‘direct and obvious’ economic effect relevant to the Bank’s work.”95 
Dañino called for a “purposive” interpretation of the Articles, “examined against the 
backdrop of the current international legal regime and the evolving understanding of 
development.”96 He explained that “there are instances in which the Bank may take human rights 
into account, and others in which it should. Indeed, there are some activities which the Bank 
cannot properly undertake without considering human rights.”97 Dañino then outlined three 
increasing levels of Bank involvement in human rights. First, he explained that the Bank may 
                                                 
91 Dañino, supra note 14, at 9.  
92 A number of Shihata’s legal opinions and memoranda during his tenure from 1983 to 1998 were 
published in a book: IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL PAPERS (2000). 
93 See Articles of Agreement, supra note 68, Art. IV, sec. 10, and Art. III, sec. 5(b). 
94 SHIHATA, supra note 70, at 109. 
95 According to some legal scholars, Shihata’s economic test is ambiguous and does not contain clear 
criteria. It “does not stipulate the time period over which the directness and the obviousness of the economic impact 
of the particular factor should be determined. If the time period for analysis is short, then relatively few nonobvious 
economic issues will have a direct and obvious effect.” Bradlow, supra note 58, at 61. 
 96 Dañino, supra note 14, at 3. 
97 Id. at 5, 7. 
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take a supportive role in assisting a country in fulfilling its own human rights legal obligations 
(when it expresses its wish to do so), provided that these commitments “have an economic 
impact or relevance.”98 Second, when a country has violated or not fulfilled its obligations, the 
Bank should take them “into consideration,” again provided that they have an economic impact. 
So far, Dañino’s opinion does not stray very far from those of Shihata.  
When describing the third level of Bank involvement, Dañino differed from Shihata in 
not requiring any economic impact and stating that the Bank should do something in extreme 
cases. He stated, “[I]n egregious situations, where extensive violations of human rights reach 
pervasive proportions, the Bank should disengage if it can no longer achieve its purposes.”99 This 
is a major departure from Shihata’s view. Yet the opinion did not clarify what are considered to 
be “extensive violations” or “pervasive proportions.” Without this further clarification, there is a 
danger of ad hoc disengagement based on political factors. 
Dañino highlighted a number of other significant issues in his opinion: (i) the 
indivisibility of rights (“the Bank should not make a distinction between different types of 
human rights” (e.g., economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political rights);100 (ii) 
the existence of economic evidence that establishes a correlation between human rights and 
economic growth;101 (iii) a recognition of norms that traverse national boundaries (e.g., 
“corruption, corporate or financial crimes, money laundering, corruption, environmental hazards, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity”);102 and (iv) a transformation of the concept of 
                                                 
98 Id. at 7. 
99 Id. at 8. 
100 Dañino, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
101 Id. at 5. 
102 Id. at 6. 
   
 34 
sovereignty with relation to human rights.103 On the last point, the opinion cited customary 
international law on human rights and argued that “[t]he balance [between state sovereignty and 
human rights] has . . . shifted in favor of protecting human rights, with the concept of 
sovereignty having itself been transformed by the evolution of human rights standards and the 
pursuit of human rights enforcement at all levels of international law in global, regional and 
domestic fora.”104 Despite this statement, Dañino did not go as far as saying that international 
organizations like the Bank are bound by international human rights law. The only subjects of 
international human rights legal obligations, according to Dañino, are states.  
Finally, the opinion reflected the role of the private sector in influencing developments 
towards social responsibility at the Bank. Dañino argued that it is “standard practice” among 
private banks to rely on an analysis of not only economic factors, but all factors that affect 
investments, including social, environmental, and political ones.105 In his March 2004 speech at 
NYU that formed the basis of this opinion, he further used the private sector as a model for the 
Bank. He argued that the Bank, “although a development institution, is primarily a financial 
institution. . . . [L]ike its private sector counterparts, [the Bank must consider] . . . the 
‘investment climate’ in the recipient country.”106 Moreover, in an October 2005 speech at the 
Bank, Dañino compared his experience there with his work on Wall Street where, he explained, 
commercial and investment banks are similarly supposed to make decisions based on economic 
considerations alone. Yet he noted that these banks all have political risk units that analyze the 
political impacts of investments on countries and the political realities of their borrowers. Thus, 
                                                 
103 Id. at 6-7. 
104 Id. at 7. 
105 Dañino, supra note 14, at 4-5. 
106 Roberto Dañino, The Legal Aspects of the World Bank’s Work on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
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they recognize that political dimensions are relevant factors for decision-making. Dañino 
concluded that since private banks consider political factors, “[w]hy should the Bank refuse to do 
so?”107  
The Opinion’s Uncertain Legal Status and Limited Impact 
 
 
 The 2006 legal opinion seemed to clear the way for the Bank’s adoption of human rights 
norms. It removed a major obstacle—legal restrictions in the Articles of Agreement—that Board 
members and employees had long cited as the reason why the Bank could not directly engage in 
human rights. It also raised the status of Legal Department lawyers who had played a minimal 
role in earlier initiatives within the Bank but were now in the position to lead internal discussions 
over a possible human rights strategy. 
 Yet the opinion had a limited impact due to ambiguity over its legal status and a resulting 
uncertainty over whether the Legal Department should circulate it as the Bank’s “official” 
interpretation of its Articles. General Counsels customarily write legal opinions in response to a 
request from the Board, which would then endorse them as official Bank opinions. In the case of 
Dañino’s opinion, senior Bank management, rather than the Board, had asked Dañino for 
guidance on the issue of human rights. 
The opinion was not submitted to the Board because senior officials knew that the Board 
was sharply divided over human rights and would very likely not endorse it.108 Dañino felt that it 
                                                 
107 Roberto Dañino, Welcoming remarks at a seminar on “Gender-Based Violence and Equitable 
Development: The Role of the International Community,” World Bank, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 24, 2005). Yet 
Dañino also notes that “[i]t is easier for a private company to walk away from a particular investment than for the 
Bank to do the same with respect to an investment program affecting a whole country.” Id.  
108 The Board conventionally operates by consensus so any disagreements between countries over human 
rights would be enough for the Bank not to approve the opinion. 
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was not the right time to confront the Board on this issue. He stated that it was “impossible,” at 
least at this point in time, to get a policy or opinion approved by the Board:  
 
That’s the reason that I didn’t want to go to the Board. . . . Because if you go 
there, [some of the Board members might try to] stop us. . . . And I knew for a fact 
that we didn’t have a consensus [in the Board], so what’s the point in hitting a 
brick wall? So I didn’t go there.109 
 
The Board’s lack of endorsement of an opinion would be a public condemnation of internal 
efforts to push a human rights agenda forward in the Bank. It may even result in a backlash by 
Executive Directors, who may then become more vigilant in prohibiting any human rights-
related initiative that they deem as contrary to the Bank’s mandate. Dañino and other senior 
officials felt that it was best to operate “under the radar” with regard to controversial issues like 
human rights.110 
With little chance of the opinion being approved by the Board in the near future, it 
currently has an uncertain legal status. Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the Executive 
Directors have the authority to decide questions of interpretation of the Articles’ provisions.111 
Legal opinions from the General Counsel are only intended to offer guidance to the Board in 
deciding these questions. Yet, there is no precedent for how to treat opinions unapproved by the 
Board and written by a General Counsel who has since departed.  
                                                 
109 Interview with Roberto Dañino, former General Counsel, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 26, 
2006). 
110 See infra Part IV.B.2. I should briefly note that the Legal Department’s decision not to formally present 
the opinion to the Board did not mean that Board members did not know of its existence. A member country 
representative that was supportive of a human rights agenda at the Bank had told me that he was familiar with the 
opinion and supported the under the radar strategy, since he was well aware of the unlikelihood of gaining Board 
approval of the opinion.  Interview with Senior Advisor to an Executive Director, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. 
(May 11, 2006). 
111 Articles of Agreement, supra note 68, Art. IX. 
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Among employees who had read the opinion, there was wide disagreement about its 
status. A senior member of the Legal Department said it should be treated as “an internal matter, 
part of an iterative process. . . . It’s considered as a source of advice for management, but not the 
Board.”112 Some staff questioned the process by which it was drafted and its legitimacy as an 
official Bank opinion. They claimed that it only represents Dañino’s personal opinion and does 
not carry legal weight on an institutional level since the Board never requested the advice of the 
General Counsel on this issue.113 According to a senior Bank lawyer, the unclear status of the 
opinion put the Legal Department in a period of limbo.114 
 Despite the opinion’s uncertain legal status, there was still an opportunity for it to 
provoke a discussion among staff about the role of human rights at the Bank—an issue that had 
been taboo for many years. The opinion’s flexible interpretation of the Articles of Agreement 
could have created an enabling environment for more explicit work on human rights. However, 
the great majority of staff did not receive the opinion on January 31st when it was released, or on 
any day thereafter. The opinion appeared in the inboxes of only the members of the Legal 
Department and a selected number of vice-presidents and senior officials. While some of the 
lawyers then forwarded the opinion to their colleagues in other departments, there remained (and 
still remain) many staff that had not read the opinion, let alone knew that it existed even months 
after its release. The Legal Department made no effort to circulate the document to the rest of the 
staff and, even more remarkably, some lawyers obstinately refused to disclose its contents when 
asked. Inquiring employees were told that it was the exclusive domain of the Legal Department 
                                                 
112 Interview with Senior Counsel, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 2006). 
113 Interview with official, Social Development Department, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Development Network, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1, 2006). 
114 Interview with official, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 21, 2006). 
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and could not yet be shared to “outsiders,” referring to not only the press and NGOs but also 
anyone in the Bank outside of the department.115 Nevertheless, NGOs were leaked a copy of the 
opinion, which they subsequently posted on their websites.116 
There is precedent for not disclosing opinions outside of the Bank. They are supposed to 
remain internal only, although they are often leaked externally. Under the Bank’s disclosure 
policy, the General Counsel cannot publicly release legal opinions without the Board’s 
approval.117 The only prior occasion when opinions were externally released was the publication 
of former General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata’s legal opinions and memoranda in a book.118 In this 
case, Shihata “sought a special authorization from the Bank’s Executive Directors.”119 However, 
the Bank’s disclosure policy does not prohibit opinions from being disclosed to staff outside the 
Legal Department.120  
So why wasn’t the 2006 opinion circulated more widely across the Bank? In addition to 
the opinion’s questionable legal status, my research points to another underlying reason for why 
members of the Legal Department did not or even refused to circulate the opinion—internal 
conflict within the department over value-laden issues like human rights. In order to understand 
this conflict, one must analyze the practices and status of lawyers and economists within the 
bureaucracy as well as the clash of expertise within the Bank’s organizational culture. 
 
                                                 
115 Personal communication (Feb. 1, 2006). 
116 See, e.g., http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/?q=en/node/335. 
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III. THE BANK’S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
 
 
If legal constraints insufficiently account for the marginality of human rights at the Bank, 
we must look inside the organization. One must examine the Bank’s organizational culture to 
determine how bureaucratic obstacles have shaped the adoption and diffusion of human rights 
norms. An organizational culture is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central 
tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”121 It encompasses a range of factors, 
including the formal goals of an organization, its mission, the prior experiences and personal 
beliefs of employees, “the expectations of their peers, the array of interests in which their agency 
is embedded, and the impetus given to the organization by its founders.”122 Organizations do not 
have homogenous cultures, but multiple subcultures that may operate in conflict. This is the case 
for the World Bank, where subcultures are based on such factors as employees’ disciplinary 
backgrounds or the geographic regional unit in which they operate.  
 My study of the Bank analyzes its culture as a political process of constructing and 
negotiating meanings, which are continuously contested. I uncover the formal characteristics of 
an organization, including its management structure and operational policies.123 I also analyze 
the informal characteristics such as power dynamics among staff and the Bank’s incentive 
system, which emphasizes lending targets rather than results on the ground. Below I will briefly 
describe the explicit and implicit goals and incentives that are relevant to human rights adoption.  
                                                 
121 JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 91 
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Processes of Norm Socialization 
 
 
An organization has a sense of mission when it has a clearly defined direction and 
principal goals behind its operations. The mission “confers a feeling of special worth on the 
members, provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and enables the 
administrators to economize on the use of other incentives.”124 A strong sense of mission can 
foster loyalty to the organization and camaraderie among staff, but can also favor the dominant 
subculture and lead to resistance to new tasks that seem incompatible to it.125 Such new tasks and 
programs may be given less resources or prominence within the organization as compared to 
those supported by the dominant subculture.  
 The explicit mission of the Bank is poverty reduction, according to its Articles of 
Agreement. Yet given the vagueness of this goal and its vulnerability to multiple interpretations, 
the Bank has been accused of “mission creep” by those inside and outside the organization. 
Mission creep refers to the shifting of activities away from an organization’s original mandate.126 
One could distinguish between the Bank’s explicit mandate and multiple implicit mandates, 
which can cover a range of poverty reduction-related issues. For example, when Bank 
management has resisted issues like human rights (particularly certain civil and political rights), 
it has defined them as outside the Bank’s mandate and thus not worthy of being part of the 
organization’s work program. Within the institution and within employees themselves, there is 
significant debate as to the core mission of the Bank and what activities can be considered 
consistent with it.  
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 Processes of socialization condition employees as to what are the unstated assumptions 
behind their work and what issues are taboo to discuss and/or work on. Socialization refers to “a 
systematic means by which [organizations] bring new members into their culture.”127 It can 
occur through recruitment procedures, training, informal conversations with peers, and rituals 
that validate the organizational culture. Norm socialization processes inculcate employees with 
the generally accepted values and expected behavior in an organization.  
 One mechanism by which socialization occurs is through incentives (both pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary), which “tell people specifically what is valued and comparatively more important 
in the particular setting and how, therefore, to allocate attention and effort among competing 
objectives.”128 The Bank’s incentive system could be summed up in this statement: “The culture 
of the Bank is getting a project to the Board. . . . You get your intellectual brownie points from 
your peers in the Bank by saying that I have taken a 200 million dollar project to the Board in so 
many months, and so many years. That’s what gives you standing.”129 While this incentive is not 
explicitly stated in staff manuals, it becomes part of the common knowledge of employees soon 
after they join the Bank.  
There are a number of problems with this incentive system, some of which are articulated 
by an employee: 
 
It’s very easy to measure money out the door but hard to assess your contribution 
to results. How do you know that it was your project that achieved [a particular 
result]? Also, managers move [to different departments] and there are big lags in 
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129 Interview with official, Global Development Learning Network, World Bank Institute, in Washington, 
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things—people think you can change a country in two years, but you can’t. You 
need to have a very sophisticated system for assessing your contribution to 
development in your specific area. And that’s hard to do, and it’s hard to do it in 
the time period where they can hold you accountable for that.130 
 
Since projects often take many years to yield results, promotion is not tied to favorable long-term 
outcomes. Rather, it is based on the approval of projects and the size of those projects in terms of 
money loaned. In addition, it is often difficult to find a causal relationship between a manager’s 
actions and a project’s long-term effects, given that there are many external factors (e.g., the 
political conditions on the ground) that are also at play. James Q. Wilson refers to bureaucracies 
like the Bank as “procedural organizations,” where the ways in which staff “go about their job is 
more important than whether doing those jobs produces the desired outcomes.”131 In other 
words, only outputs rather than outcomes can be observed in such organizations. 
What are the indirect results of the Bank’s incentive system on policy compliance by 
employees? Given my interest in human rights, I have focused on the Bank’s safeguard policies, 
which are designed to avoid or mitigate detrimental impacts of Bank activities and ensure that 
operations are financially, socially, and environmentally sound. While there is no safeguard 
policy on human rights, many of the existing policies address human rights-related issues. They 
include cultural property, environmental assessment, forests, indigenous peoples, involuntary 
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resettlement, natural habitats, and safety of dams.132 Although employees are required to apply 
the policies in borrower countries, they do not consistently do so in practice.133  
While the Bank promotes its safeguard policies as indicative of its concern for 
environmental and social goals, its implicit incentive system suggests that these goals are not 
primary. In fact, most employees perceive the policies as impediments to lending because they 
add constraints to tasks and thereby reduce efficiency and opportunities for promotion. Policies 
may also create a perverse incentive: For instance, staff may avoid projects that would benefit 
indigenous peoples (by redesigning projects in areas unpopulated by them) so that they would 
not be required to complete additional time-consuming and costly tasks under the Bank’s 
Indigenous Peoples Policy.134 These tasks include the preparation of an indigenous peoples 
development plan and the scheduling of public consultations.135 Because task teams (the 
operational groups that prepare and supervise projects) have limited budgets and a restricted 
timetable, they have an incentive to minimize the number of policies that they have to comply 
with.136 Policies may serve more as maximum ceilings rather than as minimum standards.  
There is discretion among project managers as to how to apply safeguard policies and 
how to balance compliance with other goals. Some managers who are sympathetic to human 
rights and view them as part of the Bank’s mandate are more careful in applying the policies in 
their projects. Yet, they still face pragmatic dilemmas when trying to balance competing 
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principles. One employee noted that “[i]n the day-to-day operations, very often principles may 
contradict each other. For example, we want [projects] to be participatory and for people to have 
a say and be involved, but at the same time we want projects to go very fast.”137 Employees also 
face ethical dilemmas in their work. They may be internally divided over how to balance their 
support for human rights-related concerns with their allegiance to the implicit Bank goal of 
quickly approving and carrying out projects with the least interference and complications. One 
lawyer that I spoke to described a dilemma he is facing in an African country that has one of the 
largest AIDS problems in the world but also one of the most repressive regimes.138 Should the 
Bank stop lending to the country because it has unfairly locked up dissidents, even if it means 
closing down its AIDS project that is significantly helping its poor population? Employees are 
not given guidance as to how to balance competing priorities like these and are not encouraged to 
discuss ethical issues.139 
The “Knowledge Bank” 
 
 
Within the institution, knowledge is considered to be the currency of value, and having a 
Ph.D. is more the norm than the exception. The Bank’s collection of knowledge, which it has 
gathered over many years of experience advising developing countries, is its comparative 
advantage over commercial banks and private investors and gives it authority over other 
development agencies.140 Its research departments are unparalleled in the field of development—
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few, if any, universities have the depth and breadth of practical experience that is housed in the 
Bank. In the mid-1990s, former President Wolfensohn began to define it as a “knowledge bank,” 
focused on not only lending money but also the production and transmission of development-
oriented ideas, analysis, and advice to client countries.141 By doing so, “existing products and 
services [were] redefined as knowledge assets, or augmented with knowledge of how they are 
used.”142 The accumulation and dissemination of knowledge on development is now considered 
a complementary goal to the promotion of economic growth.143 In-house research can, at least in 
theory, be integrated into the Bank’s everyday operations and made available to policymakers in 
client countries; in other words, ideas can be put into practice.144  
How does knowledge circulate within the Bank and what are the conditions under which 
it is produced? In order to answer this question, it is important to analyze the Bank’s 
management structure, which significantly shapes the processes of knowledge production and 
circulation. The Bank is divided into two major groups: the operations units and the network 
units. The operations units are responsible for carrying out development projects on the ground 
and maintaining relations with member countries. They are divided into six geographic regional 
units, whose cultures are quite distinct. The operations units are further sub-divided into five 
thematic areas, including Sustainable Development, Human Development, and Infrastructure.145 
                                                 
being “used to proselytize on behalf of Bank policy, often without taking a balanced view of the evidence, and 
without expressing appropriate skepticism.” ABHIJI BANERJEE ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK RESEARCH, 
1998-2005, 4 (2006). 
141 See James Wolfensohn, Former President, World Bank, Address at the World Bank/International 
Monetary Fund Annual Meetings (1996). 
142 THOMAS H. DAVENPORT, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: HOW ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE WHAT THEY KNOW x 
(1998). 
143 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The World Bank at the Millennium, 109 ECON. J. F577, F590. 
144 See Christopher Gilbert et al., Positioning the World Bank, 109 ECON. J. F598, F610 (1999). 
145 As of July 1, 2006, the Bank merged a number of thematic areas, resulting in a reduction of network 
units from seven to five. The current network units are: Financial and Private Sector Development, Human 
   
 46 
The network units form the research arm of the Bank and offer advisory services to the 
operations staff in the form of reports and referrals to experts. These units cover the same 
thematic topics as the operations units but are not sub-divided geographically.  
Since 1997, the Bank has operated under a matrix organizational structure, with 
overlapping geographic and functional units and parallel reporting relationships that are intended 
to promote knowledge management. Matrix structures, which became fashionable in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, feature a diffusion of responsibility along multiple lines of command.146 
For instance, an employee in operations may be concurrently responsible to bosses in three units: 
a country management unit (based in the field), at least one network or thematic research unit in 
the headquarters (e.g., poverty, the public sector, the environment, or infrastructure), and a sector 
management unit. The sector management unit is the department where the employee sits in the 
headquarters, and corresponds to a particular geographic region and thematic area (e.g., Latin 
American Sustainable Development or African Health and Education). It is also the unit 
responsible for an operations employee’s performance appraisal and promotion (although it also 
receives comments from the other units). 
 When the Bank holds a staff orientation training session, it devotes a considerable 
amount of time to the goals, functions, and benefits of “the matrix environment.”147 One of the 
primary objectives of the matrix is to facilitate knowledge seeking and sharing through 
collaboration and teamwork among units. Knowledge sharing can enhance the quality of Bank 
assistance. For example, operations employees are expected to maintain strong affiliations with 
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multiple thematic groups, which provide cross-country comparisons and best practice examples 
on a particular issue like developing a transport sector strategy. One advantage of a matrix 
structure is that “[i]ts multiple information channels allow[] the organization to capture and 
analyze external complexity.”148 Such complexity includes interdependent activities and the need 
to respond quickly and flexibly to changing environments. In addition, an integration of 
geographical and functional groups can, in theory, promote innovative ideas and cooperation 
among staff. 
However, the matrix system has grown unpopular among many employees who question 
whether it achieves its stated objectives. The material from the staff orientation training session 
boasts that the matrix structure enables staff to “balance potentially conflicting objectives.” This 
seems to be a grave problem in practice as employees find it difficult and confusing to report to 
multiple bosses, particularly when the bosses assign them conflicting tasks. Management 
scholars have reiterated this criticism. They have observed that “the proliferation of channels [in 
a matrix] create[] informational logjams, . . . and overlapping responsibilities produce[] turf 
battles and a loss of accountability.”149 The training session material itself admits to some of the 
challenges of the matrix—e.g., ambiguous roles and reporting relationships, power struggles, 
high levels of staff stress, and decision-making problems. 
Moreover, in the case of the Bank, the matrix structure does not necessarily facilitate 
cooperation among staff towards promoting innovation. A senior official who had recently 
joined the institution observed that while the matrix is supposed to create a marketplace of ideas 
that compete for influence, he is “not really sure that it functions as a perfect market, that the best 
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ideas are winning.” He lamented that there is “a loss of resources being spent on running that 
system.”150 Most of the new ideas come from people in the network, since those in operations are 
too busy designing and running projects. Despite the matrix’s objective of collaboration between 
network and operations units, there is an underlying tension between them. Operations 
employees often complain that those in the network do not understand the day-to-day 
responsibilities of managing projects and dealing with country governments, and, as a result, 
their research is not always relevant to operational work.151 
The network, which serves as a community of professionals united by a thematic work 
program, is the source of new knowledge, although country knowledge gathered by operations 
staff is also highly valued. The network’s centrality in the Bank’s management structure 
indicates the importance of experts in this knowledge-based organization. With expert 
knowledge given such a high priority in the Bank’s work program and management structure, it 
is not surprising that it serves as an important factor in determining status among employees.  
A Clash of Expertise 
 
 
Staff behavior is shaped by a number of factors, including employees’ prior experience, 
political ideology, personality characteristics, and professional or disciplinary background.152 It 
is this last factor that I focus on because, based on my interviews and observations, it is one of 
the strongest sources of identification among staff, as well as a basis for sharp internal division. 
Having undergone specialized formal education in a discipline, employees derive much of their 
                                                 
150 Interview with official, Legal Department, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 8, 2005). 
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knowledge and skills from their professional background and are strongly influenced by 
professional norms. This is especially true in an organization like the Bank where employees are 
given a lot of discretion under operational rules to pursue often vaguely defined goals. In 
addition, many employees perceive their disciplinary background as a key contributing factor in 
determining their status and opportunities for career advancement within the organization.  
Composed of multiple, often competing groups of professionals, the Bank’s 
organizational culture is an “epistemic community,” a “network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”153 Employees come from about 160 different 
countries and include economists, political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists, 
environmentalists, financial analysts, and engineers, among others. The number of non-
economist social scientists has grown steadily over the past three decades, from about a dozen in 
the 1970s and early 1980s to over 200 in 1998 (based on the number of people in the newly 
established Social Development Network).154 At the same time, the number of engineers, once an 
influential expert group at the Bank, has decreased. Thus, the dominance of a particular expertise 
among staff has shifted over time.  
Professional groups may exhibit competing preferences over goals for the organization, 
including visions for what development means and how it can be achieved. They speak distinct 
languages arising from their disciplinary training, which may impede conversation and 
collaboration. In an analysis of policy debates at the Bank, a few employees observed:  
                                                 
153 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L 
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In DEC [the development economics research group], and among country 
economists and country managers, talk revolves around quantification, statistical 
significance, and formal models. Among operational staff, the grammar is 
different—it revolves around usability, and among many of the social scientists, 
around social and political change.155  
 
Power relations between professional communities are apparent in turf wars, where departments 
try to assert their authority and influence within the larger organization. Experts struggle over 
who has authority and jurisdictional control over particular issues, such as human rights. One of 
the sharpest divisions is between economists and non-economists, particularly lawyers. Within 
the Bank, forms of expert knowledge are valued differently, with economic knowledge ranking 
the highest. 
The Prestige of Economists and the Dominance of Economics 
 
 
The dominant subculture within the organization consists of economists because their 
expertise is considered the most valuable to the Bank’s core work of promoting poverty 
reduction and economic growth. They have an influence way beyond their numbers. Economists 
comprise the majority of senior management positions (although they do not make up the 
majority of staff), and their way of thinking prevails within the institution, including their 
definition of development success. Moreover, the prestigious country director positions, which 
are responsible for dialogue with country ministers and budget allocation to the sectoral units at 
the headquarters, are most commonly held by economists. It is important to note, however, that 
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there are different types of economists in the Bank, including neoclassical and institutionalist, 
which also compete for authority.  
Economists have their own prestigious research group (the development economics 
group, or DEC), which hires top economists and recent doctorates, mostly from U.S. and British 
universities. There is no comparable effort to recruit top members of other professions as there is 
to recruit economists into DEC, and there is no serious career track for non-economists as there 
is for economists.156 DEC economists produce high-quality academic papers that influence Bank 
staff, public policymakers in member countries, and the academic community. Since employees 
in operations rarely have enough time to write academic papers, and those in the network often 
do not have an opportunity to research topics of their own choosing, DEC serves as an important 
platform for the transmission of new ideas across the institution.157  
The dominance of a single profession may be harmful for the Bank, as one senior 
economist acknowledged: 
 
In my view, the limitation of the Bank up to this point is that we’ve been wedded 
to one discipline: economics. So fashions and trends and fads in that discipline 
have affected the fashions and trends and fads of economic development at the 
Bank. So why shouldn’t the fads and fashions of anthropology or political science 
affect it?158 
 
Non-economists often feel that they have to translate their writing and speech into economists’ 
language and quantify their observations in an effort to gain legitimacy for their ideas. Although 
                                                 
156 One exception is the Young Professionals Program, which annually recruits 20–40 talented young 
people from a variety of professional backgrounds, including economics.  
157 On the rare occasions that operations staff do have time to write, their audience is usually development 
practitioners rather than academia. 
158 Interview with official, Development Research Group, World Bank, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 14, 
2006). 
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they lack the theoretical training, they learn “a craft version” of the economics knowledge 
system.159 What distinguishes the economics professional from the legal one, for example, is that 
one can claim to be an economist without advanced training or licensing while once cannot claim 
to be a lawyer without passing the bar exam.160 Staff with backgrounds other than economics 
may even call themselves economists in order to gain status: I met a public sector specialist with 
a public policy background who chose the title of political economist for this reason. This form 
of “workplace assimilation” has discouraged informed debate among different disciplinary 
perspectives and has created a sense of inferiority among some non-economists.161  
The Status of Lawyers and the Legal Department 
 
 
Lawyers do not typically serve as the intellectual leaders among staff or as key players in 
policymaking and agenda-setting. The great majority of lawyers in the Bank are part of the Legal 
Department, which is dominated by transactional lawyers who work on loan agreements and 
advise staff on operational policies and law-related issues.162 Aside from a small number of 
lawyers in operations who work on legal and judicial reform and other public sector projects, 
lawyers typically do not serve as project team leaders and their participation in projects is usually 
limited to technical legal tasks. Unlike economists, lawyers are not encouraged to spend their 
time writing academic papers. Although the Legal Department has organized seminars in order 
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to foster intellectual dialogue on legal topics (for example, a two-day Legal Forum in December 
2005 and a seminar series with external academics), lawyers are mainly expected to be skilled in 
a practitioner-based knowledge.163  
 The reputation of the Bank’s Legal Department has historically been at a higher level 
than its current state and has shifted over time, often in line with the strength of leadership by the 
General Counsel.164 The appointment and dismissal of the General Counsel is the responsibility 
of the Bank’s President.165 The role of the General Counsel “may vary according to the 
organization, the time period, and even the personalities involved.”166 When the Bank’s General 
Counsel has played an influential role in the institution, there has been an opportunity for 
lawyers within the Legal Department to go beyond such traditional duties as drafting loan 
agreements, advising on the legal aspects of Bank operations, and contributing to the formulation 
of and compliance with the Bank policies and procedures. They have at times served as 
                                                 
163 In 2004, former General Counsel Roberto Dañino tried to raise the prestige of the Legal Department and 
inspire a new generation of lawyers to join the Bank. To that end, he established the Legal Associates program, 
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policymakers, innovators, and institution-builders.167 For example, during the tenure of former 
General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata, the Legal Department played a key role in designing the 
Inspection Panel168 and launching the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).169 In addition, Shihata’s legal opinions on governance 
and the rule of law paved the way for the introduction of legal and judicial reform projects into 
the Bank’s agenda.170 The General Counsels since Shihata, as well as the Legal Departments that 
they supervised, have played a much weaker role in Bank policymaking and institution-building. 
Moreover, since Shihata there has been a high turnover of General Counsels, all of whom have 
served less than five years as compared to Shihata’s fifteen year tenure.  
The Legal Department’s increasingly weak leadership in Bank decision-making, as 
compared to its status under Shihata, made it difficult for lawyers to play an influential role on 
the issue of human rights. Moreover, because only lawyers from the Legal Department have full 
access to legal opinions and internal memos, as well as the Bank’s law library, there has been 
limited open dialogue between lawyers and the rest of the staff over legal opinions like the 2006 
opinion on human rights.171 This has not always been the case. Legal opinions used to be 
accessible to all Bank staff, but the practice ended when lawyers were feeling challenged by non-
lawyers in operations, who had criticized some of their legal interpretations.172  
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Finally, as is the case for any department or organization, there is internal conflict within 
the Legal Department. There are lawyers who favor a conservative, formalistic interpretation of 
legal issues, while others adhere to a progressive one. For example, the 2006 Legal Opinion on 
Human Rights did not represent a unity of views within the department over the Articles of 
Agreement. It was drafted by a small group of lawyers led by Dañino and was circulated within 
the department for comment. While there was no vocal opposition, a number of lawyers 
preferred a more cautious approach and later questioned its status as an official legal opinion.  
Even after the opinion was released, there was resistance from within the department to 
openly discussing and publicizing it. An informal group of lawyers approached the Deputy 
General Counsel about ways to foster open dialogue within the department on the opinion’s 
practical implications. The lawyers thought that this would be a good time to spark an internal 
conversation about the role of human rights, which they considered long overdue. Yet they knew 
that proposing a Bank-wide discussion would have been too radical at this time, since it may 
have appeared to challenge the authority of the Legal Department. That is why they instead 
suggested a safer alternative: a brown-bag lunch that would be restricted to members of the 
department. (Brown-bag lunches are low-key events, as opposed to daylong seminars or 
conferences.) Nonetheless, the Deputy General Counsel rejected this event as still being “too 
controversial.”173 His resistance demonstrates a cautious attitude among members of the 
department and an unwillingness by some lawyers to promote discussion of new ideas. Internal 
conflict inhibited the Legal Department from presenting a united position on human rights and 
leading staff in an open discussion in light of the recent opinion.  
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IV. FRAMING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS TO ADAPT TO THE BANK’S CULTURE 
 
 
  How does the clash of expertise within the Bank’s organizational culture play out over 
particular issues like human rights? More generally, how does it shape efforts at organizational 
change? In Part II, I demonstrated that the failure of internal attempts to push forward a human 
rights agenda at the Bank was in large part due to institutional obstacles, including internal 
conflict over how to interpret and implement human rights norms. In this Part, I analyze how 
different professional subcultures within the organization correspond to distinct interpretive 
frames on human rights.174 Interpretive gaps between frames are critical obstacles in achieving 
norm internalization in bureaucracies. In the context of the Bank, interpretive gaps refer to 
differences between employees’ interpretations of human rights, including how they justify their 
relevance with respect to the Bank’s mission and conceptualize their practical role in Bank 
operations.  
Of course, interpretive gaps are only one obstacle towards achieving norm 
internalization. Other important factors include an appropriate staff incentive system to motivate 
behavior, leadership by senior and middle management, and the investment of sufficient 
resources to effectively institute policy changes. But I argue that particularly for the Bank, the 
clash between interpretive frames is an underemphasized factor that has hindered the 
development of a human rights consciousness among staff. After elaborating on the interpretive 
gaps, I describe how members of the Legal Department are taking them into account in their 
recent efforts to bring human rights into the Bank. Instead of legalizing human rights, they are 
framing them in a way that appeals to economists. They are also pursuing an incremental 
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approach to generate staff support for human rights while remaining under the radar of the Board 
of Executive Directors. 
Competing Interpretive Frames 
 
Professional subcultures within the Bank hold distinct interpretive frames that shape their 
understanding of issues and their preferred strategies for implementation.175 Members of 
subcultures “routinely take actions on the basis of collective understandings to the group.”176 
Their “distinctive worldview[s] and normative commitments” often derive from their 
professional background, such as law or economics. 
The two main interpretive rationales for understanding the value of human rights for the 
Bank and development in general are the intrinsic and instrumental frames. Proponents of the 
intrinsic frame view human rights as universal and indivisible, and they value their protection as 
an end in itself. In contrast, proponents of the instrumental frame provide a functionalist rationale 
for promoting human rights, as a means to an end. They measure the value of human rights based 
on whether they enhance development effectiveness and make good business sense. As I 
describe below, the two interpretive frames roughly correspond to distinct disciplinary ways of 
thinking.177 
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There are two subgroups within the intrinsic frame—the first emphasizes the legal 
dimension of human rights while the second emphasizes their moral dimension. The first 
subgroup defines human rights as legal obligations that derive their legitimacy from the 
international human rights regime and, in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.178 Members of this subgroup include, not surprisingly, many Bank lawyers, as well as 
civil society advocates. They view rights as implying corresponding legal duties for state 
governments. The Bank lawyers who are committed to this interpretation have expressed grave 
concerns about any attempt to dilute the basic legal tenets of human rights and to “water down” 
corresponding obligations.179 They insist that it “is essential . . . that efforts to integrate human 
rights in development practice not compromise those key characteristics [of legal obligations and 
duties] in the process, and risk the impoverishment of rights discourse and the undermining of 
core values and objectives that human rights were conceived to realize.”180 
The second subgroup of the intrinsic frame emphasizes the moral dimension of human 
rights. Its members define rights as primarily ethical principles or moral imperatives, founded on 
a conception of fundamental human dignity and a framework of common values. They often 
advocate for a principles-based approach that focuses on ethics and social policy goals that are 
not necessarily attached to legal standards. Members of this subgroup include many non-
economist social scientists, such as anthropologists and sociologists. One manifestation of this 
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interpretive frame is the Bank’s 1999 report on Principles and Good Practice in Social Policy, 
primarily drafted by employees in the Social Development Department.181  
Adherents of the instrumental frame value human rights as a means of achieving 
developmental objectives like economic growth. Given their pragmatic orientation, adherents of 
this approach often mention possible trade-offs that must be made when implementing human 
rights, especially in countries with limited resources. They prioritize the fulfillment of those 
rights that achieve poverty reduction and economic growth. Because many economists typically 
adhere to this interpretive frame, it holds a lot of weight in the institution.  
Evaluating the Bank’s Recent Efforts 
 
 
Following former General Counsel Roberto Dañino’s resignation in January 2006, 
internal human rights advocates were left with a potentially influential legal opinion but no one 
to champion it. The opinion remained in a sort of legal limbo as members of the Legal 
Department disagreed on its status and hesitated to circulate it throughout the rest of the Bank. 
Many members of the Legal Department were also reluctant to discuss it openly even within the 
department. Nevertheless, a small number of lawyers continued their efforts to push the human 
rights agenda forward. This section describes the institutional obstacles that the lawyers 
encountered, and how they have redesigned their strategy to adapt to the Bank’s organizational 
culture.  
In late 2005 and 2006, an informal group of lawyers (many of whom would help draft the 
2006 legal opinion) began to organize activities towards furthering the human rights agenda and 
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taking an explicit approach to human rights. A prominent member of the group was a senior 
lawyer from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was hired in October 2005 by the Legal 
Department. His appointment was funded by the Nordic countries, which have demonstrated 
strong support for a human rights agenda.182 On October 20, 2005, the Nordic countries 
presented a working paper to former President Paul Wolfowitz entitled, “The World Bank and 
Human Rights.”183 The paper discussed “why and how the human rights perspective should be 
enhanced in the World Bank’s policies and operations with a view to reinforcing its development 
and poverty eradication mission.”184 It opened a dialogue on human rights with former President 
Wolfowitz and became part of a new Nordic and Baltic-sponsored initiative. 
The initiative’s first order of business was the creation of the Justice and Human Rights 
Trust Fund, whose purpose was “to provide effective support . . . to include human rights 
considerations in the analytical and operational activities of the World Bank Group.”185 Its 
proposed activities included empirical research, country case studies, and outreach across the 
Bank through human rights education and training of operations staff. The trust fund would be 
managed by the Legal Vice-Presidency, in cooperation with representatives from other Bank 
units, and would have a minimum life span of five years.  
Due to internal politics and a collapse in leadership following the resignation of 
Wolfowitz, the Justice and Human Rights Trust Fund never launched as of publication of this 
Article. Yet the deliberations that I witnessed in 2006 over the objectives and activities of the 
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trust fund suggest possible ways to operationalize human rights norms in the Bank. While 
designing the trust fund’s plan of action, the Bank lawyers faced resistance and had to revise 
their approach to adapt to the Bank’s organizational culture. Their recent efforts address (or, at 
times, sidestep) a number of the institutional obstacles that had plagued prior efforts to introduce 
human rights. These include: the lack of a pragmatic orientation; the failure to conduct outreach 
to staff in headquarters and the country offices; a lack of resources; and a fear by the Board and 
senior management that human rights is too controversial and beyond the Bank’s mandate. 
Framing Human Rights for Economists 
 
 
The lawyers who helped draft the 2006 legal opinion realized that there was an 
interpretive gap between their vision of human rights and that of the economists who dominate 
the Bank. They spoke with employees in the headquarters and field offices who questioned the 
added value of a human rights approach when compared to existing best practices, which already 
incorporate a number of human rights principles. Throughout these discussions, they 
encountered a need for more empirical work to demonstrate the causal links between human 
rights and economic development. Some employees complained of a lack of clarity over what is 
meant by a rights-based approach to development. Would it simply be a rhetorical repackaging 
of existing practice? There was also a perception among many staff that human rights norms are 
overly rigid, particularly when defined with respect to international legal instruments. They leave 
little room for the tradeoffs that are often necessary in development practice. 
As the lawyers debated over how to design the new trust fund, they were torn over 
whether an instrumental approach would dilute the intrinsic meaning of human rights. They 
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recognized that they needed a dual approach that adhered to not only a legal interpretation but 
also the instrumental frame. Yet they were worried over possible risks in taking an overly 
technical approach to rights. Despite their misgivings, the lawyers decided to emphasize how 
human rights enhance development effectiveness and make good business sense. I call this 
strategy: “economizing human rights.”186 It is an effort to demystify the concept of human rights 
and build a constituency among staff while emphasizing an empirical approach that measures 
human rights performance using indicators.  
According to a senior Bank economist, “[w]e will not make inroads in the Bank if 
[human rights] language is not made into economic language.”187 This statement suggests the 
importance of translating human rights into the dominant discourse of economics. The decision 
to economize human rights represents a recognition by the lawyers that past attempts to 
introduce the agenda failed in part because of a failure to build a constituency at the Bank. The 
following statement by another Bank economist emphasizes the value of empirical evidence in 
pushing agendas like corruption forward within the institution: 
 
I think that things really happen in the Bank when an economic case could be 
made for them. You put it in economic language. This is how corruption came in. 
It sort of became acceptable internally to talk about corruption when people could 
show with cross-country regressions that it’s related to lower growth. . . . People 
needed this to say that “Okay. It’s alright for us to work on this.” So one obstacle 
would be to try and articulate rights issues in the way that economists could 
understand.188  
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As part of an attempt to speak to economists, the lawyers adopted a largely instrumental 
approach to rights in the proposed Justice and Human Rights Trust Fund.  
One of the trust fund’s main objectives was to “serve as a hub for bolstering an emerging 
community of practice around human rights in the Bank.”189 In preparation for the trust fund, the 
Norwegian government financed a workshop on May 15-16, 2006. The topic of the workshop 
was developing indicators for “measuring justice,” in order to evaluate the performance of a 
country’s justice sector.190 Also discussed at the workshop was the Legal Department’s project 
on human rights indicators, developed in collaboration with the Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, which began in 2005. As part of this empirical focus, the lawyers also proposed pilot 
projects in borrower countries. Pilot projects would allow for an empirical study of the effects of 
using a human rights approach in Bank projects, as compared to existing practices.  
Operating “Under the Radar”: Pursuing Pilot Projects Rather than a Policy 
 
The trouble with the Bank is that getting anything adopted as an institutional 
position or strategy is really tough because . . . there’s been a shift towards 
decentralizing things. So getting to a policy is almost the last step after things have 
already percolated [within the institution]. It’s almost like practice precedes policy 
in this place. . . . Back in the 1990s, it was the opposite way—that if you wanted 
to get something done, you would push the policy first, and then practice would 
follow. For example, the safeguard policies. Those were key to getting people to 
change behavior. It’s kind of the opposite now. [Changes in] behavior tend to 
happen through pilot projects.191 
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After years of internal and external advocacy for an institutional policy on human rights, internal 
advocates began moving towards a country-level approach. The lawyers who designed the trust 
fund decided that Bank country staff should take the lead on any human rights initiative, with 
support from the donor community. They felt that regional and national ownership of a human 
rights agenda is critical. One reason for this tactic is the important decision-making role played 
by country directors at the Bank, “much more so than vice presidents, . . . and certainly much 
more so than sector directors or sector managers. [They are the ones] who are really making the 
decisions in terms of resource allocation, and are leading the dialogue with the country.”192 
One of the trust fund’s preparatory workshops focused on country-level initiatives, 
including pilot projects, the integration of human rights principles into national development 
strategies, and the promotion of human rights dialogues with national authorities.193 Another 
proposed project was the incorporation of human rights into the poverty reduction strategy 
papers of selected governments—those that request assistance in incorporating human rights 
concerns in their development strategies. The Bank would assist the governments in “translating 
internationally agreed human rights standards into operational policy actions, thereby prioritizing 
support for those services that both contribute to economic and social development and 
constitute human rights obligations on the state.”194 The team of lawyers behind the recent 
approach made an important decision to focus on pilot projects rather than to advocate for a 
stand-alone operational policy. One reason for this decision is the previously discussed staff 
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incentive system, in which internal promotions are based on lending targets rather than 
compliance with safeguard policies. In my interviews, I found a general resentment among staff 
to the existing policies: 
 
People [have been] feeling that the compliance police are after them, and that the 
procedures are rigid and bureaucratic. . . . And there [is] a lot of weariness from 
the experience of the safeguards about trying to make things mandatory because 
it’ll be seen as a burden. So the idea is trying to do this through good practice 
examples. . . .195 
 
Another reason is the lawyers’ recognition that they could not get a policy approved by the 
Board, which is sharply divided over the issue of human rights. As a result, they decided to 
pursue an incremental strategy of working under the radar screen of the Board.  
 An incremental, under the radar strategy stands in contrast to one of mainstreaming, 
which entails explicit management support for the incorporation of an issue into existing 
programs. An example of prior mainstreaming is the incorporation of environmental concerns 
into Bank programming through adoption of an operational policy on environmental 
assessment.196 Yet to introduce a more sensitive and controversial issue like human rights, 
internal advocates are supporting a strategy of implicit management support and avoidance of the 
Board. A senior advisor to an Executive Director acknowledged the value of an incremental 
strategy for human rights. He commented that Bank officials “shouldn’t try and get a formal 
process going because it would backfire, and that [they] should basically do a human rights 
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agenda through stealth.”197 The Executive Director of the Bank’s Nordic Baltic office agreed. He 
explained that trust funds are a way to introduce controversial changes into the Bank: “The 




 Analyzing organizational culture is useful to understanding organizational change and 
predicting how IOs behave. The conditions under which norms are adopted and internalized in 
an organization are shaped by its culture, including its mission, management structure, incentive 
system, and decision-making process. Internalization occurs when actors vernacularize norms, or 
adapt them to local meanings and existing cultural values and practices.199 There is not a 
universal recipe for how to bring about internalization in IOs. Rather it is necessary to find an 
institutional fit for norms. They must be framed to adapt to the structural, functional, and cultural 
distinctiveness of each institution. 
The recent initiative to push human rights forward at the Bank offers insights on how to 
bring about organizational change. Until recently, bureaucratic obstacles have impeded the 
Bank’s adoption of human rights norms. In particular, there has been a clash of expertise 
between lawyers and economists over how to define human rights and justify their relevance 
with respect to the Bank’s mission. In an effort to appeal to the dominant subculture of 
economists, internal advocates are framing human rights as quantifiable and instrumentally 
valuable towards the economic development goals of the Bank. They are pursuing an 
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incremental strategy from the bottom-up through country-level pilot projects, rather than a top-
down official policy. By late 2006, the strategy became public and no longer under-the radar,200 
but it is too early to gauge its success. This approach represents one potentially effective way of 
bringing human rights norms into the Bank. Another may be to alter the existing distribution of 
power within the institution (and thus the organizational culture) so that lawyers have more 
decision-making power and status as compared to economists and other professional groups. 
However this is a radical change that would likely take many years and would require support 
from the leadership.  
Human rights are a particularly difficult set of norms to incorporate into an economic 
institution because they force employees into a struggle between principles and pragmatism—
i.e., a tension between pursuing normative, intangible values and goals, and finding a practical 
way to solve problems (which may involve reconciling competing principles). In an environment 
like the Bank where most issues are subject to cost-benefit analysis, employees may be 
ambivalent about principles that appear to be non-negotiable or subject to trade-offs. They may 
perceive potential costs to trying to commensurate seemingly incommensurable values.  
What are the consequences of economizing rather than legalizing human rights? Some 
critics fear that although legalizing human rights norms may limit their persuasiveness within the 
Bank, an economic framework would dilute their meaning and serve as a ceiling for future 
human rights standards of other development agencies. There are thus potential risks of 
translating human rights too far into the existing power structure. As an anthropologist has 
observed, if human rights “are translated so fully that they blend into existing power 
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relationships completely, they lose their potential for social change.”201 This is part of the 
dilemma of human rights framing and vernacularization strategies: they will not induce radical, 
long-term change if they do not challenge existing power structures and are too compatible with 
dominant ways of thinking.202 Yet they also need to resonate with local cultural understandings 
in order to appear legitimate and appealing, and to thus become part of local rights 
consciousness.203 
This raises a number of important questions: Can human rights be so extensively 
vernacularized that they lose their essential core, or even contradict their fundamental meanings? 
Do human rights need to remain connected to a legal regime (and be linked to state obligations 
deriving from international law) in order to still be considered “human rights” and not another 
concept like “empowerment”?  
Ethnographic studies can illuminate the process by which norms become internalized 
within international institutions. They uncover the multiple normative frameworks that often 
compete within institutions. Interpretive gaps between these frameworks may lead to under-
implementation or inconsistent compliance to norms, whether human rights or otherwise. 
Analyzing the organizational culture of an institution can help one determine how to overcome 
bureaucratic obstacles and devise an appropriate strategy for organizational change. 
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